The 2011 political parties expert survey in Greece by Gemenis, Kostas & Nezi, Roula
THE 2011
POLITICAL PARTIES
EXPERT SURVEY
IN GREECE
Kostas Gemenis and Roula Nezi
UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE
The 2011 Political Parties Expert Survey in Greece
Kostas Gemenis and Roula Nezi (principal investigators)
Report, version 1.0
Date: January 2012
Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS), Fedora Identifier: easy-dataset:48574
Contact:
Dr. Kostas Gemenis
Department of Public Administration
University of Twente
P.O. Box 217
7500 AE Enschede
The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 53 489 3256 / 3270
Fax: +31 53 489 2590
E-mail: k.gemenis@utwente.nl
Cover design: Ifigenia Vasiliou (http://ifigen.gr)
The 2011 Political Parties Expert Survey in Greece
Kostas Gemenis1 and Roula Nezi2
1Assistant Professor of Research Methods, Department of Public Administration, University of Twente
2PhD candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Athens and Visiting Fellow, Department of Public
Administration, University of Twente
Introduction
This report presents a new dataset on the ideo-
logical and policy positions of Greek political par-
ties, based on an expert survey conducted ap-
proximately three years after the beginning of the
global economic crisis which has became known
as the ‘Great Recession’.
Using experts to elicit knowledge has a long
history in the social and behavioural sciences
(Hoffman et al. 1995). Ever since the publica-
tion of the expert survey on parties’ Left-Right
(L-R) positions by Castles and Mair (1984), ex-
pert surveys have seen extensive use in po-
litical science, especially in a cross-national
context (Huber and Inglehart 1995, Kitschelt
et al. 2009, O’Malley 2007, Ray 1999, Vowles
and Xezonakis 2009). Notwithstanding some
methodological concerns (Budge 2000) which
we partially address in this report, expert sur-
veys have been shown to provide valid and
reliable estimates of political parties’ positions
(Benoit and Laver 2006, Hooghe et al. 2010,
Steenbergen and Marks 2007).
After pretesting a pilot survey to a small num-
ber of political scientists in order to get feed-
back on the included parties and questions,
we contacted 52 political scientists who have
an extensive knowledge of Greek politics and
asked them to participate in our survey. The
selection of experts was based on the direc-
tory of the Hellenic Political Science Association
(http://www.hpsa.gr/) and a Google Scholar
search for authors publishing on Greek contem-
porary politics. 25 of the experts we contacted
were affiliated with higher education institutions
in Greece, 24 with institutions abroad, whereas
three experts were affiliated with institutions both
in Greece and abroad. Questions were asked
in the Greek language and our survey was sent
via e-mail using the Lime Survey platform (http:
//www.limesurvey.org/).
Lime Survey ensured the anonymity of the
survey as well as compliance with the regula-
tions of the Dutch telecommunications author-
ity (OPTA). To ensure that the survey would be
completed only by the invited experts, each e-
mail address was associated to a unique ran-
domly generated token. There were 34 re-
sponses to our survey which were collected in
the period between 5 December 2011 and 2 Jan-
uary 2012. This gave our survey a response rate
of about 65.4%, one of the highest among expert
surveys on political parties conducted in Greece
(see Table 2).
Our questionnaire surveyed 12 parties (Table
1), far more than any other expert survey con-
ducted in Greece so far (Table 2). Our data
therefore allow the placement of many small
but established extraparliamentary parties which
made gains during the 2010 regional elections
or created after recent splits in established par-
liamentary parties (PASOK, ND and SYN). The
survey included 14 questions. Three questions
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Table 1: Parties included in the expert survey.
Abbreviation Name % Vote Seats
PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement 43.92 153
ND New Democracy 33.47 83
KKE Communist Party of Greece 7.54 21
LAOS Popular Orthodox Rally 5.63 16
SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left 4.60 9
GREENS Ecologist Greens 2.53 -
ANTARSYA Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left .36 -
Chrysi Avyi Chrysi Avyi (Golden Dawn) .29 -
DIMAR Democratic Left - 4
DISY Democratic Alliance - 4
ARMA Panellinio Arma Politon (Panhellenic Citizens Chariot) - 1
DRASSI/Liberals Drassi /Greek Liberals - -
Note: % vote Oct. 2009; seats as of Dec. 2011.
regarding parties’ positions on general ideologi-
cal scales (Left-Right, social and moral issues,
state intervention in the economy), four ques-
tions about parties’ positions on policy dimen-
sions (environment, immigration, European and
foreign policy), four questions about the impor-
tance of these dimensions, two questions about
party leader positions and internal party dissent
on the issue of solving the debt/deficit problem
respectively, and one question about experts’
sympathy towards the surveyed parties. The
question wordings make the data comparable to
those collected by previously conducted expert
surveys.
Based on the survey responses we have cre-
ated two datasets, with experts and parties as
units of analysis respectively. The translation
and further details about the question wordings
and response scales are available in the associ-
ated Codebook which has been deposited to the
Data Archiving and Networked Services (http:
//www.dans.knaw.nl/) along with the datasets
and the original Greek language questionnaire.
In the following two sections, we present some
preliminary analyses and showcase how the two
datasets, at the expert and party level, can be
used for methodological and substantial analy-
ses.
Using the experts dataset to ad-
dress methodological issues
Although the positions for most of the parties in
our survey have never been estimated before,
we decided to include them in the survey be-
cause we anticipated the response of a large
number of experts. One could ask whether the
inclusion of small parties on the far left (AN-
TARSYA) or the far right (Chrysi Avyi) could have
influenced the position of the established parties.
Albright and Mair (2011) have recently put this
question to test using a randomized survey ex-
periment and found that there is no consistent
evidence that the inclusion of smaller parties af-
fects the mean or median placement of larger
parties.
Including small extraparliamentary parties still
leaves the possibility of their positions being es-
timated with a lot of uncertainty. To address
the issue of uncertainty, we included at the bot-
tom of each response scale a link for each party
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Table 2: The 2011 expert survey compared to the Greek component of other expert surveys.
Experts
Survey Parties Questions Total Surveyed Response rate
Laver and Hunt (1992) 4 36 23 5 .22
Ray (1999) 8 12 15 10 .67
Lubbers (2001) 7 7 15 4 .27
2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey 4 15 19 11 .58
Benoit and Laver (2006) 4 20 44 16 .36
2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey 6 39 22 10 .45
Vowles and Xezonakis (2009) 5 14 29 12 .41
This survey 12 14 52 34 .65
Table 3: Uncertainty in parties’ L-R estimates.
Party RR SD A
PASOK .91 1.11 .76
ND .97 .74 .84
KKE .97 1.51 .77
LAOS .97 .83 .82
SYRIZA .97 1.58 .71
Ecologist Greens .97 .86 .79
ANTARSYA .88 1.84 .81
Chrysi Avyi .97 .03 .99
DIMAR .97 1.03 .80
DISY .91 .88 .81
Panellinio Arma Politon .71 1.69 .64
Drassi /Greek Liberals .91 .45 .65
Note: RR: response rate; SD: standard devi-
ation; A: perceptual agreement coefficient
pointing out to its latest party manifesto or pol-
icy statement available in the official party web-
site. This way experts could use party man-
ifestos and policy statements as ‘informational
cues’ (Einhorn 1974) and make more informed
judgements. Moreover, our data allows address-
ing uncertainty resulting from expert disagree-
ment in a systematic way. For instance, Ta-
ble 3 presents three indicators of uncertainty
regarding parties’ positions on the L-R scale:
the response rate (RR), the standard devia-
tion (SD) and the perceptual agreement coeffi-
cient A, a non-standard deviation based statis-
tic which aims to measure the ‘peakedness’ of a
distribution (van der Eijk 2001).
As shown in Table 3, for most parties there is a
fairly high perceptual agreement among the ex-
perts. There are two exceptions however, Pan-
ellinio Arma Politon and the electoral coalition
between two small liberal parties Drassi and the
Greek Liberals. The former is a party created by
Giannis Dimaras, an erstwhile PASOK MP who
disagreed over the government’s decision to ac-
cept the IMF/EU bailout package and contested
the 2010 regional elections as a governor candi-
date against his former party on a anti-IMF pro-
gramme (Gemenis 2012b). The party has little
access to the media in terms of presenting its
programme so it is not surprising to see that ex-
perts have different perceptions over where this
new one-MP party stands ideologically.
Uncertainty is slightly less pronounced in the
case of the electoral coalition between the small
liberal parties. Although none of the two parties
enjoys parliamentary representation or has sup-
ported independent candidates during the latest
regional elections, the liberal label made it eas-
ier for experts to estimate the L-R position as
evident by the higher response rate and lower
3
Table 4: Assessing experts’ ideological bias on parties’ L-R estimates.
Regression Simulation Survey
Party Coeff. 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
PASOK -.266 [-.438, -.094] 5.14 [4.78, 5.49] 5.35 [4.95, 5.76]
ND -.365 [-.522, -.209] 6.40 [5.96, 6.86] 7.33 [7.07, 7.59]
KKE -.015 [-.315, .285] 1.87 [.88, 2.87] 1.91 [1.37, 2.44]
LAOS -.296 [-.430, -.162] 7.48 [7.02, 7.99] 8.45 [8.16, 8.75]
SYRIZA .042 [-.191, .275] 2.35 [1.62, 3.14] 2.24 [1.68, 2.80]
Ecologist Greens .113 [-.019, .246] 3.25 [2.95, 3.55] 3.39 [3.09, 3.70]
ANTARSYA -.077 [-.648, .494] 1.43 [-.76, 3.37] 1.67 [.98, 2.36]
Chrysi Avyi .031 [-.335, .397] 10.07 [8.54, 11.65] 9.97 [9.91, 10.03]
DIMAR -.077 [-.262, .107] 3.83 [3.42, 4.22] 3.76 [3.39, 4.12]
DISY -.055 [-.208, .098] 6.37 [6.06, 6.68] 6.39 [6.06, 6.71]
Panellinio Arma Politon .093 [-.463, .648] 3.96 [2.14, 5.66] 3.79 [3.08, 4.51]
Drassi /Greek Liberals -.309 [-.537, -.082] 6.41 [5.93, 6.89] 6.39 [5.85, 6.92]
Note: bold font indicates statistically significant coefficients and mean differences between the
simulation and the survey.
standard deviation among the responses.
In a way, the measures in Table 3 assess the
degree of random measurement error stemming
from disagreement among the experts. Random
error makes estimates less precise but does not
bias them in any way. Ideology, however, has
long been recognized as a potential bias in ex-
pert judgement (Mumpower and Stewart 1996,
194) especially when experts are asked to make
estimates about the ideological positions of po-
litical parties. Our survey makes estimating the
presence of such bias possible since, like Laver
and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006)
have done before, we asked experts to state
their degree of sympathy for each party. Follow-
ing the approach of Curini (2010), we regress
the L-R scores to the sympathy scores for each
party and then estimate the mean placement by
simulating the scenario where all experts would
be neither sympathetic nor hostile to parties (5.5
on a 1–10 sympathy scale).
As evident from the results in Table 4, in
four out of 12 parties (PASOK, ND, LAOS and
Drassi /Greek Liberals) the regression coefficient
indicating the presence of ideological bias is sta-
tistically significant. Out of these four cases, for
only two parties this bias is translated in sub-
stantive and statistically significant differences
in the mean placement on the L-R scale. For
both conservative ND and radical right LAOS
parties, the simulations implemented by Clar-
ify (King et al. 2000, Tomz et al. 2003) indicate
that the mean placement of ND and LAOS un-
der the simulation scenario of unbiased experts
would be about one point to the left on the 1–
10 L-R scale. Interestingly, the placement of
the extreme right Chrysi Avyi does not seem
to be influenced by this bias, although this has
more do with the lack of variance in the data (32
out of 33 experts placed the party on 10) which
prevent us from making reliable statistical infer-
ences. These findings are consistent with pre-
vious studies where experts have been found to
be biased against radical right and mainstream
conservative parties (Curini 2010), although we
found that the bias was less prominent when ex-
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perts were asked to position parties in specific
policy dimensions.
Making inferences by using the
parties dataset
Greece was one of the hardest hit countries in
Europe and the first to request the financial as-
sistance of the IMF and its EU partners. Politi-
cally, the financial crisis has led to a snap elec-
tion in October 2009 where the incumbent con-
servative party (ND) suffered the worst defeat in
its history. Consequently, the main opposition
party PASOK was elected on a platform which
included promises for a 2 billion Euros stimu-
lus plan, which were quickly abandoned when
prime minister George Papandreou accepted a
joint EU/IMF bailout package. Amidst the aus-
terity measures and continuing protests, sup-
port for the government quickly evaporated. The
declining in support for the two major parties
(Dinas 2010, 394–395) together with the inter-
nal party disagreements over economic policy
which resulted in party splits contributed to the
fragmentation of the party system. After a cab-
inet reshuffle in June 2011 and much delibera-
tion, Papandreou resigned the following Novem-
ber. A cabinet formed by former president of the
ECB, Lucas Papademos received support by an
unlikely combination of coalition partners which
includes PASOK, ND and the radical right LAOS.
Figure 1 presents Greek parties’ positions
on the L-R scale. The placement of parties
from left to right is very intuitive, especially
when contrasted to the placement of parties by
the Comparative Manifestos Project (Dinas and
Gemenis 2010, Gemenis 2012a, Lefkofridi and
Casado-Asensio 2012). ANTARSYA, KKE and
SYRIZA are placed on the extreme left, in many
respects an expected placement. ANTARSYA
is an electoral coalition of anti-capitalist extra-
parliamentary groups, KKE is an orthodox com-
munist party which rehabilitated Stalin in its last
ANTARSYA
KKE
SYRIZA
GREENS
DIMAR
ARMA
PASOK
DRASSI/LIBERALS
DISY
ND
LAOS
Chrysi Avyi
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Left−Right position (with 95% confidence interval)
Figure 1: Party positions on the L-R scale.
congress, whereas SYRIZA is an electoral coali-
tion of Maoist, Trotskyist and other leftist parties
(Gemenis 2010, 355–356). The 95% confidence
interval bars indicate that the differences in their
mean placements are not statistically significant.
This implies that the positions for the three most
leftist parties are largely indistinguishable from
one another, although the experts were able to
find differences in other policy dimensions.
To the right of these three parties we find an-
other group of three parties which occupy indis-
tinguishable from one another places on the the
L-R scale. Again, this is an expected outcome as
DIMAR collaborated with the Ecologist Greens
in the 2010 regional elections by supporting
common candidates in three regions (Gemenis
2012b). DIMAR was created on February 2010
when the most moderate faction within SYN (the
largest constituent party of SYRIZA) walked out
due to organizational and ideological disagree-
ments. Nevertheless, the proposal for an elec-
toral coalition between the two parties for the up-
coming parliamentary election was rejected by
the Greens, who apparently wish to keep their
coalition options open. For Panellinio Arma Poli-
ton, a very small PASOK splinter which primar-
ily mobilizes against the terms of the IMF/EU
bailout, the measures of uncertainty show that,
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apart from the opposition to the IMF, the experts
found it very difficult to assess its position in
other policy dimensions.
PASOK occupies the centre of the L-R scale,
a finding consistent with all the expert and
mass surveys conducted in Greece over the past
twenty years, even though the PASOK MPs tend
to place themselves to the left of their party
(Nezi, Sotiropoulos and Toka 2009, 1010). To
the right of PASOK and the left of conservative
ND, we find the three small liberal parties. DISY
was created on November 2010 after its leader,
Dora Bakoyannis, failed to win the ND leader-
ship and was consequently expelled by the new
party leader for voting in favour of the IMF/EU
bailout (Gemenis 2010, 355–356). In the previ-
ous section, we showed that the observed differ-
ence between the liberal parties and ND may be
due to the experts’ antipathy towards the conser-
vatives but the results in other policy areas reveal
the absence of such bias. This means that there
are perceivable ideological differences between
the liberals and conservatives in Greece which
cannot be attributed to bias. In fact, the populist
discourse of the new conservative leader as well
as his collaboration with the radical right LAOS
in the 2010 regional elections (Gemenis 2012b),
may signalled a rightward trend which prompted
the exit of the liberal faction.
To the right of the conservatives we find the
radical right LAOS and Chrysi Avyi. LAOS has
been traditionally an anti-immigrant party which
a particular emphasis on law and order and a
nationalist approach to foreign policy (Gemenis
and Dinas 2010, 190–191), whereas Chrysi Avyi
is a nationalist and xenophobic organization akin
to the British National Front. In terms of eco-
nomic policy both parties are characterized by
a ‘welfare chauvinism’ (see Mudde 1999), al-
though this is not reflected in the L-R scores
most likely because immigration and nationalism
have been the defining characteristics of the rad-
ical and extreme right. In general, however, the
party scores on the L-R scale are very intuitive
which attest to their usefulness in validating re-
sults from other methods of estimating parties’
policy positions.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the
L-R and parties’ positions on the issue of the
IMF/EU bailout. High scores on the latter dimen-
sion indicate that the party is in favour of a solu-
tion for the Greek debt/deficit within the IMF/EU
framework whereas low scores indicate that the
party is in favour of a solution which involves exit
from the Euro and suspending the payment of
the country’s loans. The relationship between
the two dimensions is the classic inverted U
where centrist parties are in favour of European
integration while extremist parties argue for ex-
iting the EU (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002).
The scatterplot also shows the pivotal position
of the DIMAR and the Ecologist Greens at the
centre of the debt/deficit scale, although this is
largely associated with the ambiguity of their pol-
icy positions on this issue (Botetzagias 2011).
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Figure 2: A two-dimensional view of the policy
space in Greece during the ‘Great Recession’
(lines are quadratic fit with 95% confidence in-
tervals).
The importance of the debt/deficit dimension
in contemporary Greek politics is evident when
one wants to explain the unlikely government
coalition among PASOK, ND and LAOS. Even
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though the three parties are not very close on
the L-R scale, together with the liberal parties
which support the government informally, oc-
cupy the top positions in the scatterplot that in-
dicate support for a solution within the IMF/EU
framework. This implies that the ‘Great Reces-
sion’ is gradually changing the salience of the
European integration dimension in national poli-
tics. As politicians find it increasingly difficult to
separate policy-making at the national level from
the European and international developments,
the conflict over European integration is becom-
ing increasingly important for national politics.
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